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Closing the Group or the Market?  
The Two Sides of Weber’s Concept of Closure and Their Rele-
vance for the Study of Intergroup Inequality† 
 
Andrés Cardona 
andres.cardona@uni-bielefeld.de 
 
Abstract 
The Weberian concept of closure, the concerted collective action aimed at excluding rival 
groups from competition for economic opportunities and resources, has captured the at-
tention of sociologists studying stratification and social inequality for decades. Closure 
has been suggested as a cause of intergroup inequality across professional, ethnic, reli-
gious, and national boundaries, among others. However, most studies applying the con-
cept have ignored a basic distinction drawn by Weber between closing the market to 
competitors and closing the group to outsiders. This inattention has not only been respon-
sible for conceptual confusion but also threatens to undermine the usefulness of the con-
cept in understanding intergroup inequality. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it re-
examines Weber’s definition of closure and shows that in its original formulation, market 
closure is different from group closure. Second, it argues that making this conceptual 
distinction is essential for disentangling two phenomena that are equally capable of pro-
ducing inequality among groups. Apart from a brief exegesis of Weber's account of clo-
sure, a simple computer-simulated agent-based model (ABM) is offered to illustrate how 
market closure and group closure, combined with individual competition, are inde-
pendently sufficient to bring about an unequal distribution of resources among groups. 
The message for empirical researchers using closure as an explanation of inequality is 
clear: failing to draw the distinction between closing the market and closing the group 
will, at best, lead to causal indeterminacy or, at worst, to false causal conjectures.  
 
Keywords: social closure, exclusionary action, intergroup inequality, agent-based models 
(ABM), ODD protocol 
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Introduction 
 
As briefly discussed in Economy and Society, Weber introduced the concept of closure to 
describe two different group-related phenomena.1 Closure denotes, first, the more or less 
intentional process of groups drawing boundaries against outsiders, driven not only by 
economic interests but also by tradition or affectual bonds (Weber 1978, 43–6). Group 
closure leads to the formation of exclusive groups regulated by formal or informal mem-
bership rules such as those observed, for example, in private clubs or political parties. 
Besides the creation of group boundaries, Weber also used the word ‘closure’ to describe 
a form of economic action in which groups strategically instrumentalize their boundaries 
with the sole purpose of limiting or eliminating competition from rival groups to secure 
access to economic resources and opportunities (Weber 1978, 339–48). In this second 
type of closure, it is not the group but the market that becomes closed to free entry and 
free competition. In closed markets, allocation is conditioned by group membership, as in 
the extreme case of regulated markets for professional services where entry is reserved 
only for licensed practitioners.  
Since, in both cases, the outcome of closure is the emergence of ‘outsiders,’ either in 
the form of individuals excluded from a group (e.g., women in a men-only club) or 
groups excluded from a market (e.g., unlicensed lawyers in a regulated market for legal 
services), the concept has greatly appealed to contemporary sociologists devoted to the 
study of stratification and intergroup inequality. On the theoretical side, the concept of 
closure with its double meaning of market closure and group closure has been extended 
and articulated into broader theories of stratification by Parkin (1979), Murphy (1988), 
and, more recently, Tilly (1998).2 At the same time, and mostly influenced by the works 
of Parkin and Murphy, empirical research on stratification over the past two decades has 
shown a growing interest in closure as a mechanism producing different forms of inter-
group inequality, including dimensions such as gender, race, occupation, and citizenship, 
among others (See Appendix 1 for a list of selected empirical studies on closure and ine-
quality).  
While both efforts to expand the theoretical leverage of closure as the primary force 
driving intergroup inequality and the growing empirical studies applying the concept are 
valuable and welcome contributions to stratification research, they have been accompa-
nied by an unfortunate conceptual inattention.  The problem, already pointed out over 30 
                                                          
1 There are at least two alternative uses of the word ‘closure’ in sociology which are not directly related to 
the Weberian definition. The first is found in Giddens (1973) and his theory of class structuration. 
There, he uses the word ‘closure’ to refer to intergenerational and individual mobility chances (p. 107). 
Coleman (1988) also employs the word ‘closure’ in his seminal article on social capital to refer to the 
density of personal ties in social networks. Network closure is a condition both for the effective 
normative control of individuals and the emergence of trustworthiness within networks (pp. 105–7) and 
has subsequently been used in research on social capital (e.g., Burt 2007). Neither of these two 
alternative usages of the word ‘closure’ should be confused with the Weberian definition reviewed here. 
2 Concepts similar to the Weberian notion of closure and their use in stratification theory are discussed in 
Murphy (1988) and Manza (1992). In economics, too, the dynamics of groups acting strategically to 
secure benefits has been widely studied. Prominent examples in this literature are the economic theory 
of groups (Olson 1971), the theory of clubs and public goods (Buchanan 1965), studies on rent-seeking, 
and the voluminous body of research on economic regulation and interest groups (Buchanan 1980; 
Tollison 1982; Rowley 1991). 
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years ago by Giddens (1980, 887) in a critical appraisal of Parkin (1970), consists in ig-
noring the distinction drawn by Weber between collective efforts to close the market by 
excluding rivals from competition, and the process of closing the group by erecting 
boundaries against outsiders. Some, like Parkin, have done this knowingly, claiming that 
market closure and group closure are the same processes (Parkin 1980).3 Others, mainly 
those working with the concept empirically, appear to have drawn selectively from We-
ber’s writings on closure using one of the two meanings of the word and ignoring the 
second. For example, while some use the concept to denote closing the market (e.g., 
Weeden 2002), others refer to closing the group (e.g., Macdonald 1985; Brubaker 1992) 
and still others merge both phenomena into one term (e.g., Tomaskovic-Devey 1993a; 
Elliott & Smith 2001).  
The purpose of this paper is not simply conceptual clarification. Nor does it aim to 
echo Giddens (1989) in calling the attention of scholars using the concept of closure to its 
two distinct meanings.  What is more urgent than that, at least for empirical research, is to 
show why ignoring this distinction will probably lead to incomplete or incorrect causal 
accounts of intergroup inequality. In other words, the present paper is not about repeating 
arguments already made elsewhere on the meaning of words, nor to convince anyone 
about the ‘right’ definition of closure. Instead, the goal is to make it clear why anyone 
interested in studying intergroup inequality should take care to distinguish between pro-
cesses of market closure and group closure. 
To achieve this goal, the first section of this paper deals with definitional issues. It 
briefly reconstructs Weber’s original formulation of closure and reiterates the importance 
of keeping market closure and group closure conceptually separate. To demonstrate that 
this distinction is not an inconsequential definitional dispute, an agent-based simulation is 
conducted in the second section, illustrating the combined dynamics of market closure 
and group closure in producing intergroup inequality. The model shows how the two 
forms of closure taken separately are sufficient to bring about an unequal distribution of 
resources among groups, hence the importance of distinguishing between these distinct 
processes when formulating causal explanations of observed intergroup inequalities.  
 
1. Weber’s Original Formulation: Defining Group Clo-
sure and Market Closure 
 
Reconstructing Weber’s use of the word ‘closure’ is the first step towards disentangling 
the differences between closing the market and closing the group. To begin with, a short 
summary of his discussion on open and closed relationships will be provided (Weber 
1978, 43–6), where closure is introduced to refer to closing group boundaries. Next, a 
widely quoted fragment of his section on the economic relationships of organized groups 
                                                          
3 In Parkin’s reply to Giddens’ (1980) critical assessment of his  Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois 
Critique, Parkin concludes:  “It simply does not make sense to say, as Giddens does, that the attempt by 
one group to monopolize resources to the exclusion of another is a separate phenomenon from group 
closure against outsiders. They are merely different ways of saying the same thing” (p. 892). 
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will be commented on (Weber 1978, 339–48), where closure describes strategic collective 
efforts to neutralize competition or market closure. The two meanings of the word will be 
explained and some translation slips between the original German version and the English 
version will be uncovered.4 The relationship between market and group closure will be 
further explored in the next section using an agent-based model.  
1.1. Group Closure5 
 
A social relationship, regardless of whether it is communal or associative in character, will be 
spoken of as “open” to outsiders if and insofar as its system of order does not deny participa-
tion to anyone who wishes to join and is actually in a position to do so. A relationship will, on 
the other hand, be called “closed” against outsiders so far as, according to its subjective mean-
ing and its binding rules, participation of certain persons is excluded, limited, or subjected to 
conditions (Weber 1978, 43).6  
 
The process of closing a relationship, Weber adds, may be driven by tradition, affectual 
bonds, or rational considerations. Thus, even if, for example, families, erotic relation-
ships, or economic groups all draw boundaries against outsiders, the logic underlying the 
emergence of those boundaries varies.  The numerous motives for relationships to be 
closed or open (traditional, affectual, or rational) combines with the wide range of collec-
tive phenomena subsumed by Weber under  his concept of relationship to produce a myr-
iad of possible conditions of participation (p. 45).7 At one end of the spectrum, formally 
constituted groups such as private clubs may screen new members through formal mem-
bership rules attached to achieved or ascribed individual characteristics. At the other end, 
more diffusely bounded groups might be found, such as “a party rally to which the largest 
possible number has been urged to come” (p. 45). 
In fact, closing a relationship in the Weberian sense, or, to use a more generic word, 
closing a group can be understood as a special case of the more contemporary notion of 
‘boundary making.’ As Lamont & Molnar (2002) summarize, boundaries are not only 
drawn by clearly identifiable groups using formal or informal membership rules to keep 
unwanted non-members at bay as in the Weberian version; they might also be symbolic. 
Symbolic boundaries segregate individuals in diffusely defined categories, such as ethnic-
                                                          
4 For the sake of precision and comparability, the English version of Weber’s works referred to in the 
following pages (Weber 1978) is the same as that used by Parkin (1979) and Murphy (1988). 
5 Sørensen (1983) uses this same notion of open and closed relationships to discuss what he calls ‘closed 
positions.’ Closed positions, such as jobs with tenure, are those to which individuals have access only 
when the positions have been vacated by previous incumbents (p. 206). Although Sørensen’s starting 
point is Weber’s passage on open and closed relationships, the two definitions should not be confused. 
While Weber is referring to the emergence and permeability of group boundaries, Sørensen is interested 
in positions in organizations and the dynamics of vacancy chains in labor markets and educational 
systems. 
6 While communal relationships (Vergemeinschaftung) refer to individuals held together by affectual or 
traditional bonds, associative relationships (Vergesellschaftung) describe individuals brought together 
by rational agreements or mutual consent (Weber 1978, 40–2).  
7 Moreover, once members are accepted into a closed relationship, not all are given equal treatment. 
Additional closed relationships within the group might prevail which regulate the internal allocation of 
group privileges following rules similar to those applied to the admission of new members (p. 45–6). 
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ity or class, and are constantly renegotiated through ever changing patterns of interaction 
within and across boundaries.  
1.2. Market Closure 
As well as in the discussion on group boundaries, Weber also uses the word ‘clo-
sure’ to designate the type of collective, exclusionary action practiced by groups 
when pursuing common economic interests. Compared to the process of drawing 
boundaries or group closure, which, Weber argues, might follow affectual, tradi-
tional, or rational motives, according to this second definition, ‘closure’ denotes 
rationally driven, economically motivated collective behavior. He describes this 
very particular form of economic action as follows: 
 
One frequent economic determinant is the competition for a livelihood – offices, cli-
ents and other remunerative opportunities. When the number of competitors increases 
in relation to the profit span, the participants become interested in curbing competi-
tion. Usually one group of competitors takes some externally identifiable characteris-
tic of another group of (actual or potential) competitors – race, language, religion, lo-
cal or social origin, descent, residence, etc.– as a pretext for attempting their exclu-
sion. It does not matter which characteristic is chosen in the individual case: whatev-
er suggests itself most easily is seized upon (Weber 1978, 341–2).  
 
Hence, groups practicing market closure as a strategy for accumulating resources and 
economic opportunities may avoid the uncertainties and difficulties of becoming better 
competitors by redirecting their efforts to exclude adversaries from the competition alto-
gether.  Not surprisingly, as Weber points out, the best way to secure group-related pref-
erential access to markets is by mobilizing the support of the state. This is the case with 
successful professionalization projects which grant a small circle of specialists, such as 
lawyers or doctors, the exclusive right to offer specialized services. It also applies to trade 
protectionism driven by industry lobbying which excludes foreign competitors from do-
mestic markets by means of prohibitive tariffs and restrictive non-tariff regulations.  
This is not to say, however, that neutralizing competition from a particular group al-
ways requires the support of the state and the legal system. Excluding rival groups from 
the market can also be achieved through informal means such as bad publicity, as in the 
case of western medical practitioners calling alternative practitioners unscientific. It can 
also be done by other less subtle yet highly effective means such as those used by the 
Sicilian mafia to protect the territorial claims of their clients’ businesses from unwanted 
competition (Gambetta 1996: Ch. 8). In any case, the crucial precondition for market 
closure practices is the existence of a group capable of collective action. To speak about 
closure practices of bounded groups not capable of concerted action would be to commit 
the fallacy of “groupism” (Brubaker 2004). As Brubaker (2004, Ch. 1) warns, not all 
groups or categorically bounded collectives, such as those defined along the lines of eth-
nicity and religion, can be assumed to act concertedly the way professional organizations 
or firms do when pursuing their common economic interests. 
Although Weber provides some historical examples of market closure practices, such 
as professional organizations lobbying the state for the legal privilege to offer their ser-
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vices, he does not discuss in any detail the outcome of such acts of strategic exclusion of 
competitors. Complementing Weber’s definition of market closure, two main outcomes 
can be expected to follow from a group acting collectively to exclude rivals from the 
market. First, closing the market should, by definition, lead to a new market situation 
where market participation is a function of group membership. To close a market is to 
change its allocation rules from a free-for-all contest where the best contender wins, irre-
spective of group membership to an administered competition in which some groups but 
not others, and certainly not all, have the privilege of participating. Second, and as conse-
quence of the first, closing a market, if done successfully, should translate into a process 
of unequal accumulation of resources and economic opportunities favoring the excluding 
party at the expense of those against whom exclusionary action was directed. Market 
closure then produces both a closed market and intergroup inequality.  
It is very important to note that Weber’s second definition of closure refers to the act 
of collectively excluding competitors from the market and not to any of its two outcomes 
– a closed market or intergroup inequality per se.  It would be misleading to assume that 
the mere existence of inequality in a market, for instance, the observed dominant position 
of one group compared to other groups, should always be attributed to closure practices, a 
confusion found in prominent works such as Murphy’s theory of monopolization and 
exclusion (Murphy 1988; e.g. p. 71-2).  Just as a group may achieve a dominant position 
by disrupting competition, acting against the market through concerted exclusionary ac-
tion directed against rival groups, it can also bring about the same result by being a better 
competitor and playing by the rules (Weber 1978, 936-7). The same caveat applies to 
closed markets. The existence of a monopoly benefiting a group should not be taken at 
face value as evidence of market closure practices.  Legally protected group monopolies 
may also result from broader societal processes which are to a large extent unrelated to 
the economic interests of the group enjoying the privilege. For example, even if the state 
passes laws to regulate certain occupational groups through exclusionary instruments 
such as licenses, the capacity of professional groups to influence the state cannot always 
be assumed to be the catalyst for such regulations (Adams 2008). Moreover, a closed 
market might also be the result of group-related discrimination, such as racism or sexism, 
where categorically-biased cognitive rules of thumb and non-concerted collective action 
are responsible for undermining the capacity of individuals to compete in the market 
(Roscigno 2007).  
1.3. An Example: Accountants in UK between 1957 and 1970 
One of the many possible instances of group and market closure that can be cited is a case 
study stemming from the history of professions.8 This study was conducted by Walker 
and Shackleton (1998) and deals with the failed attempt of the accountancy profession in 
UK to secure a state-sanctioned monopoly between 1957 and 1970. The main drive be-
hind these efforts was to exclude unqualified practitioners from the market through the 
                                                          
8 The selection of this study was not entirely arbitrary. There are two good reasons for choosing it: first, 
the literature on professions is one of the most prolific fields in sociology empirically applying the 
concept of closure (see Appendix); and second, this particular case offers a clear example of both group 
closure and market closure practiced by the same group. 
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creation of a unified professional body whose members would hold a legal monopoly on 
the provision of accounting services. For this purpose, proponents of the initiative agreed 
on two main strategies (pp. 44ff.): 
 
i) An umbrella organization was to be created to integrate competing professional 
bodies and offer standardized training for its members with clearly defined entry 
requirements based on several criteria such as education and training, work expe-
rience, employment status, location, and type of service. Not all accountants were 
to be included in this unified organization, and particularly not those regarded as 
lowering the standards of the profession.  
ii) With the support of the legislator, the members of this newly formed organization 
were to be granted a legal monopoly on accounting services. The creation of 
competing accounting organizations in the future was to be prohibited.  
 
With i), accountants expected to unify their organization by setting training requirements 
and by keeping out unqualified accountancy practitioners from their group. This, howev-
er, would not have stopped non-members from offering accounting services, or prevented 
the formation of new organizations claiming to train and certify accountants. In other 
words, i) would simply have regulated who could offer his or her services as a certified 
member of the new organization of professional accountants. The market would have still 
remained formally open to competitors offering accounting services and would also have 
allowed clients to choose freely among alternative practitioners regardless of their creden-
tials. With ii), on the other hand, not only was the new organization to be made exclusive, 
but, in addition, taking part in the market would have become the sole privilege of its 
members. Had the law been introduced and effectively enforced, accountants outside the 
new umbrella organization would not have been able to offer their services. Even if 
achieving i) would have granted members of the group the privileges of membership in a 
consolidated professional body, access to the market could only have been closed after 
having successfully accomplished ii).  
It can easily be seen how each of these two strategies fits into the concepts of group 
closure and market closure. While i) can be regarded as rationally driven group closure, 
ii) is a prototypical case of attempts at closing the market. Although, as it turned out, ac-
countants did not succeed in convincing state agencies of the benefits of their plan and 
abandoned their efforts before seeing any results, the two intended strategies clearly show 
the difference between closing the group through membership rules and closing the mar-
ket by conditioning market participation to group membership and individual competi-
tion. 
1.4. Is Closing the Market Independent from Closing the Group? 
To draw a distinction between market closure and group closure is not to deny that, under 
certain conditions, the two processes might respond to the same motives and reinforce 
each other. In cases where making the group more exclusive responds to the same eco-
nomic considerations pursued through market closure practices, closing the group might 
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correlate or even be consciously aligned with collective attempts to reduce competition 
from rival groups. Regarding this particular overlap of market closure with rationally 
driven group closure, Weber remarks: 
 
If the participants [in a relationship] expect that the admission of others will lead to an im-
provement of their situation, an improvement in degree, in kind, in the security or the value of 
the satisfaction, their interest will be in keeping the relationship open. If, on the other hand, 
their expectations are of improving their position by monopolistic tactics, their interest is in a 
closed relationship (Weber 1978, 43). 
 
Therefore, according to Weber, protecting or enhancing the privileges enjoyed by a group 
might indeed be a reason to tighten group boundaries. Religious sects or craft guilds clos-
ing their boundaries with the overt purpose of maintaining ethical standards or protecting 
their monopolistic position in the market are two examples given by Weber to illustrate 
rationally driven group closure (Weber 1978, 45).  
It would be tempting to conclude that when groups pursue their collective economic 
interests, a combination of market and group closure leads to the most favorable results. 
Market closure could be deployed to accelerate the accumulation of resources and eco-
nomic opportunities, while group closure could be used to protect accumulated resources. 
As Weber observes, however, this combined tactic is neither infallible nor always desira-
ble. Instead, groups may oscillate between openness and exclusivity depending on their 
priorities (Weber 1978, 45). Keeping group boundaries open might well be necessary to 
expand the group’s influence through the effect of sheer size. On the other hand, restrict-
ing the number of members through stronger boundaries becomes essential when the goal 
is to keep or increase the value of privileges already accumulated. Hence, even when 
group closure complements market closure in securing acquired privileges, the very pro-
cess of collective accumulation probably entails periods of expansion and permeable 
group boundaries as well as periods of consolidation and tight group boundaries.  
1.5. Why Were the Two Meanings of Closure Conflated in the First Place?  
So far, the two meanings of the word ‘closure’ have been discussed and illustrated with 
an historical example. Yet, despite the palpable differences between these two phenome-
na, research and theorizing on closure tend to ignore the distinction. Why is this so?   
There are at least three possible answers to this question. First, Weber’s readers may 
be guilty of reading Economy and Society selectively, quoting the passages on closure 
without being aware of the two meanings of the word. This also includes instances in 
which, as mentioned by Parkin, they were aware of the two meanings of the word but saw 
no point in differentiating between them.  A second possible explanation for this concep-
tual confusion is to blame the author, Max Weber. In fact, he used the word ‘closure’– 
Schließung in German – in two different contexts. As summarized above, in Weber’s 
original version of the text, the word Schließung first appears under the heading “open 
and closed relationships” (Weber 1972, 23–5); once to describe the exclusion of outsiders 
from participating in a group through membership rules (Schließung nach außen) and 
again to indicate the exclusion of members from privileges within the group (Schließung 
nach innen). In a later chapter, the word Schließung appears once more, this time as part 
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of the discussion on “open and closed economic relationships” (Weber 1972, 201–3).  But 
besides Weber and his readers, the third possibility is to blame the translators of Weber’s 
original text. The slippery conceptual choice made by Weber when using the word ‘clo-
sure’ was further obscured by slight inconsistencies in its translations into English.9 Thus, 
for instance, in one passage, what Weber terms “Regulierung und Schließung” was trans-
lated as “regulation and exclusion” (Schließung = exclusion), while “Reguliertheit und 
Geschlossenheit” became “regulation and closure” (Geschlossenheit = closure). Yet, after 
introducing the translations of the two terms, the text refers in a later passage to Schlie-
ßung no longer as ‘exclusion’ but as ‘closure.’10 As summarized in Table 1, while 
Schließung can mean both ‘exclusion’ and ‘closure,’ the word ‘closure’ is used in the 
translation to refer to both Schließung, the active act of ‘closing,’ and Geschlossenheit, 
which could be translated as ‘closedness’ and describes the resulting state of being 
‘closed.’ 
 
Table 1. Different translations of the words Schließung and ‘closure’ 
 
 Section in Economy and Society Original text and translations 
 Open and closed relationshipsa 
Schließung: closure, exclusion. 
Geschlossenheit: closure. 
 Open and closed economic relationshipsb Schließung: closure. 
aWeber (1972, 23–5), Weber (1978, 43–6).  bWeber (1972, 201–3), Weber (1978, 341–3). 
  
 
A more reasonable position is to attribute the confusion surrounding the concept of ‘clo-
sure’ to the composite effect of readers’ inattention, multiplicity of meanings in Weber’s 
original text, and small but consequential inconsistencies in the English translation of the 
concept. The result is a word with not only two, but even three meanings: the first two, as 
explained above, are genuine distinctions drawn by Weber between closing the market 
and closing the group that can be traced back to the word Schließung.  The third meaning 
was gained in translation and refers to the outcome of a group closing its boundaries to 
outsiders, or internally for the distribution of privileges within the group. It is termed 
Geschlossenheit by Weber, meaning the state of being closed. The third meaning of clo-
sure, artificially created in  translation,  must have been a challenge for readers of the 
English version of the text who were confronted with the seemingly incomprehensible 
assertion that closure (Schließung; the act of closing) produces closure (Geschlossenheit; 
the state of being closed). 
                                                          
9 Again, this applies to the English translation of Weber’s Economy and Society by Guenther Roth and 
Claus Wittich (Weber 1978), the version usually quoted in subsequent discussions on closure and the 
one used by Parkin (1979) and Murphy (1988). 
10 The exact passages referred to here are the following, quoted in German and English, respectively. (i) 
German:“Das Maß und die Mittel der Regulierung und Schließung nach außen können sehr 
verschieden sein, so daß der Übergang von Offenheit zu Reguliertheit und Geschlossenheit flüssig ist” 
(Weber 1972, 24). (i) English: “Both the extent and the methods of regulation and exclusion in relation 
to outsiders may vary widely, so that the transition from a state of openness to one of regulation and 
closure is gradual” (Weber 1978, 45). (ii) German: “Motiv der Schließung kann sein...” (Weber 1972, 
24). (ii) English: “The principal motives for closure of a relationship are...” (Weber 1978, 46). 
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To avoid any misunderstandings, Weber’s two forms of closure (Schließung) can be 
easily distinguished by explicitly naming the object of the action of ‘closing,’ as has been 
done so far in the present article: market closure or the collective exclusion of rival 
groups from competition and group closure or the collective exclusion of individuals 
from the group. Furthermore, to improve the inaccurate translation of the word Ges-
chlossenheit  (literally meaning ‘closedness’), the word ‘exclusivity,’ the adjective 
‘closed’ or the expression ‘degree of closure’ might be used instead. The level of exclu-
sivity of a group or its degree of closure is nothing more than the permeability of its 
boundaries to outsiders. If boundaries are impenetrable, the group might be described as 
being ‘closed.’  Moreover, just as group closure leads to group exclusivity or to a closed 
group, a market that is only accessible to members of a certain group can be described as 
an exclusive market, a closed market, or a market with a high degree of closure. Arbitrary 
as it may seem, ‘exclusivity,’ ‘degree of closure,’ and being ‘closed’ appear to be distinct 
enough from ‘closure’ to reduce the risk of confusing the phenomena they describe. More 
importantly, making this distinction allows us to refer separately to the action of closing 
and the outcome or state following that action.   
 
1.6. Closing the Market vs. Closing the Group: A Summary 
To close this section on the definition of group closure and market closure, Table 2 
summarizes the conceptual issues discussed so far. Four dimensions are compared: ac-
tion, actors, motive of action, and outcome.  
 
Table 2. Two meanings of closure 
 
 Group closure Market closure 
Action Groups draw boundaries against 
outsiders. 
Groups influence resource allocation 
rules in a market to limit or eliminate 
competition from rival groups. 
Actors Any group with clearly defined 
boundaries and the capacity to 
modify its membership rules. 
Group capable of concerted collective 
action and the power to modify market 
allocation rules. The latter can also be 
effected indirectly through a third par-
ty (e.g., the state). 
Motive 
Economic interests or also 
shared values, tradition, and 
affectual bonds.  
Economic interests. 
Outcome  
Exclusive group. Participation 
in the group regulated by mem-
bership rules.  
Closed market. Market allocation con-
ditioned by group membership. 
 
 
 
11 
 
2. The Relevance of Distinguishing Group Closure from Market 
Closure in the Study of Inequality 
 
Why is it important to make the conceptual distinction between closing the group and the 
market? Readers who value conceptual clarity and yet are wary of endless conceptual 
discussions with tenuous practical implications for research and theorizing might be won-
dering about the relevance of the previous pages. To appease their justified skepticism, 
this section illustrates how ignoring the difference between group closure and market 
closure may lead to incomplete or outright false explanations of group-related inequality. 
Building on the foregoing discussion, the section starts by spelling out four distinct causal 
paths which may lead to inequality among groups. Next, a computer simulation using 
agent-based models (ABM), representing the theoretically predicted dynamics of the two 
forms of closure in a simplified manner, is designed and implemented using Python.  The 
results of the simulation show that different degrees of group and market closure combine 
with individual competition to produce very varied outcomes, from one group controlling 
all resources to a relatively equal distribution of resources among groups. 
 
2.1. Individual and Group Competition in Producing Intergroup Inequality: Four 
Mechanisms 
Implied in the Weberian notion of closure is the idea that competition for economic re-
sources and opportunities can take the form of individuals going up against each other in 
a free-for-all market or of groups acting strategically by tightening their boundaries or 
attempting to exclude competitors with the purpose of raising the market success of its 
members.  Abstracting from these dynamics of individual and group competition, four 
mechanisms connecting individuals and groups to intergroup inequality can be spelled 
out. 
  
i) Pure individual competition. The definition of closure suggests that without 
group intervention in the free flow of the market, those best suited for 
competition end up better off than others not equally well equipped. Hence, the 
first mechanism connects individual attributes to market outcomes directly, 
independently of group membership.   
ii) Individual competition through group membership. The definition of group 
closure implies the possibility that groups confer advantages to their members 
which enhance their capacity to compete for resources. If belonging to a group 
furthers individual market chances by improving their market-relevant attributes, 
for example, by having access to group-specific expertise, then group 
membership may be causally connected to market outcomes. Individuals still 
compete against each other in the market but they also compete for group 
membership. This competition for group access makes other attributes (not those 
necessary to be successful in the market) equally important. Thus, gender, age, 
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ethnicity, or any other individual trait may indirectly affect market success 
insofar as these condition access to a group that increases individual market 
opportunities, even if taken alone those attributes do not affect market 
performance.  
iii) Group competition through group closure. Intimately related to the latter, when 
groups have an impact on individual outcomes, they may act strategically by 
modifying their boundaries to enhance accumulated advantages by members. 
This is the case with rationally driven group closure.  Membership rules are 
enacted and group advantages protected from outsiders. Groups that are more 
successful in protecting valued resources and opportunities will prevail in 
competition. Yet, even if groups compete to protect their assets, their advantage 
still depends on the attributes of their members. If group members fail in the 
market as individual competitors – for example, if the expertise hoarded by a 
professional group is no longer advantageous in the eyes of clients – group 
closure in itself cannot do much to curve market outcomes in favor of its 
members. 
iv) Pure group competition through market closure. A fourth mechanism draws a 
direct line between group membership and market outcomes, bypassing 
individual attributes. In a closed market, group affiliation exerts an independent 
effect on market access, hampering allocation rules based solely on individual 
attributes. If a group completely closes a market for itself, individual competition 
might still exist but only for members of the group that closed the market. All 
other potential contenders are not allowed to compete.  
 
Needless to say, these four mechanisms are mere analytical distinctions distilled from the 
very particular scenario depicted by the Weberian concept of closure where individuals 
and groups compete against each other with the sole purpose of securing economic ad-
vantages. In the following, it will be shown using a simple ABM how these four mecha-
nisms, individually or in combination, are sufficient to produce comparable levels of ine-
quality among groups.  
2.2. Simulating Individual and Group Competition Using ABM 
Computer-based simulation models are a powerful and versatile method relatively un-
derused in the social sciences as compared to the physical and life sciences. Among the 
many uses of computer models to assist social scientists – including explanation, predic-
tion, experimentation, and policy formulation (Grüne-Yanoff & Weirich 2010) – theory 
development is one of the lowest cost and relatively less controversial in a discipline still 
distrustful of the advantages of computer simulation techniques.  
Instead of gaining theoretical insights through sheer introspection, computer-based 
simulations applied to theory development provide the option of running virtual thought 
experiments to extensively explore the internal consistency and hidden complex implica-
tions of interacting theoretical premises. Simulation is then, as some have argued, a third 
symbol system available to scientists for formulating theories in addition to mathematics 
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and natural language, and an ideal tool for theory development (Hanneman et al. 1995, 
Ostrom 1988). Of the various existing simulation techniques such as microsimulation, 
system dynamics, or cellular automata, agent-based models (ABM) stand out as the pre-
ferred choice when simulated entities are thought to be heterogeneous, embedded in an 
environment, and expected to interact autonomously to reproduce non-linear and out-of-
equilibrium system dynamics (Gilbert & Toitzsch 2005). These properties combined with 
increasing computing power, object-oriented programming, and advances in distributed 
artificial intelligence have given ABM the edge in the vibrant and rapidly growing field 
of social computational modeling (Gilbert 2008; Miller & Page 2007; Squazzoni 2012).  
In the following, a theoretical agent-based model of individual and group competition 
will be offered to illustrate the dynamics of market and group closure. In the simulation, a 
simplified labor market for professional services is assumed. The purpose of the simula-
tion is not to model realistically how individuals and groups compete in a particular mar-
ket. Instead, the goal is to conduct a thought experiment based on the premises implicit in 
the definition of closure and to reproduce the dynamics of the four mechanisms identified 
above under simplified assumptions. Two main modeling decisions underlie the simula-
tion. 
 
i) While allocation in markets for professional services can be affected both by self-
employed practitioners who administer the conditions under which services are 
offered as well as by employers who hire those professionals as salaried labor, 
only the latter case was chosen for the simulation as it separates more clearly 
supply from demand on the one hand, and distinguishes between group and 
market closure on the other hand. In labor markets for professional services, 
professional groups (demand) can open and close their group boundaries 
independently from hiring decisions by employers (supply), who in turn can 
decide independently from group closure to close the market by favoring one 
group over the rest in the hiring process (Haupt 2012).  
ii) Although inequality in labor markets is usually measured at the level of 
individuals –higher pay, shorter working hours, more stable jobs – the simulation 
focuses on differences between groups. In particular, it is assumed that groups 
compete for market share by attracting skilled workers in a market niche where 
the number of jobs is fixed and where worker skills are influenced by group 
average skills. Thus, high intergroup inequality is reached if a group dominates 
the market by hoarding workers with high skills, while at the same time 
preventing workers with low skills from entering the group.  
 
Additional model assumptions and their implementation in the model are explained in 
detail in the following subsection. 
2.3. Describing the Model Using the ODD Protocol  
ODD stands for Overview, Design concepts and Details. It is a standard protocol devel-
oped by agent-based modelers in the field of ecology to overcome the difficulties of doc-
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umenting, communicating, and replicating simulation models, which so far have mostly 
lacked standardized guidelines (Grimm et al 2006; 2010). The purpose of the ODD proto-
col is to provide readers with the necessary general information to understand any simula-
tion model as well as detailed technical information to replicate it in later independent 
simulation studies. Since its publication and subsequent update, the protocol has gradual-
ly won adepts not only among ABM modelers in ecology but also in other disciplines, 
including the social sciences (Janssen et al. 2008).  
Reading the “overview” section should be enough to get a general idea of the model. 
If readers are interested in understanding the inner workings of the model and how each 
process was designed and implemented, going through the “design concepts” and “de-
tails” sections is indispensable. Otherwise, these sections can be skipped.  
 
Overview (Purpose, State Variables and Scales, Process Overview and Scheduling) 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of the model is to illustrate how individual competition, group closure, and 
market closure individually or in combination are causally sufficient to produce inter-
group inequality. The model does not attempt to realistically replicate any empirically 
observable system, but instead aims at revealing the distinct causal paths by which each 
of these processes affect the distribution of resources among groups. It simulates a simpli-
fied labor market with different degrees of market and group closure. Individual workers 
compete for a fixed number of jobs offered by a unique employer by choosing group 
membership, while groups compete for market share by closing or opening their bounda-
ries and letting in more or fewer workers with different skill levels. The degree of market 
closure is given exogenously and benefits only one group.  
  
Entities, State Variables, and Scales 
 
The simulated market consists of three types of agents:  workers, groups, and an employ-
er. The only scale the model has is time, which is defined on a positive discrete scale 
starting at t=0. Since the time scale serves only to coordinate the decisions of the employ-
er, workers, and groups, its exact meaning is irrelevant. States variables and scales are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
• Hiring decisions are made by a unique employer. There are three state variables: a 
fixed number of available jobs, group-specific hiring probabilities, and a hiring bias 
coefficient, which captures the degree to which a market is closed by modifying hir-
ing probabilities of workers belonging to a particular group. The hiring bias coeffi-
cient is activated by default at t=1 and favors one group only.   
• Workers belong to a particular group. They possess observable skills and a binary 
employment status (employed/unemployed).  Workers’ skills improve as a function 
of the average group skills of the group they belong to. There are no wages.  
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• Group size, potential size growth, market share, average skills, and employment rate 
are group-level auxiliary variables computed from worker variables. Market share 
differences are the main indicator of intergroup inequality. As agents, groups have 
only one state variable, a protection/expansion coefficient that indicates the group’s 
preference for present and future market share. The coefficient is used to compute the 
degree of group closure in the form of an exclusivity factor or the probability that a 
group rejects a new member.  
 
Table 3. State and auxiliary variables 
 
Agents State variables Auxiliary variables 
Employer 
Number of jobs (demand)  
Hiring probability for each 
group 
Hiring bias coefficient 
 
 
Workers 
Skills  
Group membership 
Employment status 
Number of workers (supply) 
Groups 
 
Protection/expansion  
coefficient 
 
Group size  
Potential size growth  
Market share 
Average skills  
Employment rate 
Exclusivity factor  
 
 
Process Overview and Scheduling 
 
Time t is discrete. Each t can be divided into three stages: before hiring, hiring, and after 
hiring. Before hiring, workers take actions aimed at enhancing their market chances in t. 
During hiring, the employer hires workers. After hiring, groups adapt to the resulting 
market conditions by closing or opening their boundaries and prepare for t+1.  
Before hiring: At the beginning of each t, workers observe their own employment sta-
tus and, if unemployed, they move to a group with a higher employment rate. A group’s 
degree of closure determines whether these attempts are successful. If unemployed work-
ers fail to enter the new group because of a high degree of group closure, they stay in 
their current group until t+1. Only after all workers have had the chance to move to a new 
group do groups compute their average skills, group size, and potential size growth. 
Workers then update their skills as a function of group average skills. Finally, groups 
update their average skills. 
Hiring: The employer observes the updated distribution of skills after some unem-
ployed workers have moved to a new group and, given a certain degree of market closure, 
hires workers until the fixed number of jobs demanded is reached. All workers are hired 
again at each t.  
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After hiring: Given the new distribution of employed and unemployed workers, groups 
update their market share and employment rate.  They also decide whether to open or 
close their boundaries by modifying their exclusivity factor, which determines the proba-
bility of a worker being rejected when attempting to enter the group at t+1.  
At the end of each t, time is increased by one unit and market share inequality is comput-
ed. The sequence of processes can be summarized as follows: 
 
Before hiring 
1. Workers [simultaneously]: Change group.  
2. Groups [simultaneously]: Compute group size, average skills, and potential size 
growth. 
3. Workers [simultaneously]: Update skills as a function of group average skills.  
4. Groups [simultaneously]: Update group average skills.  
 
Hiring 
5. Employer: Hire workers.  
 
After Hiring 
6. Groups [simultaneously]: Compute group market share and employment rate. 
7. Groups [simultaneously]: Close/open group.  
8. Increase time by one unit. Compute market share inequality. 
 
Design Concepts 
 
Basic principles: The basic processes modeled are pure individual competition, individual 
competition through group membership, and group competition through group closure 
under varying degrees of market closure. Implicit in these processes are four basic prem-
ises:   
 
i) Individual attributes are of importance for the allocation of resources (pure 
individual competition). Skills determine access to jobs.  
ii) When a group offer advantages to its members, individuals have an incentive to 
enter the group (individual competition through group membership). Workers 
skills grow as a function of group average skills. 
iii) Groups have an incentive to close their boundaries to protect the resources held 
by their members (group competition through group closure). Workers with low 
skills are left out of the group. 
iv) Groups benefit from closing the market and excluding rival groups from 
competition (pure group competition through market closure). All workers in one 
group benefit from higher hiring probabilities. 
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In the model, individuals compete for jobs either directly by offering their skills to the 
employer or indirectly by choosing group membership and benefiting from future skill 
upgrades. In the case of group closure, the model concentrates on strategic boundary 
making driven by shared economic interests, operationalized as behavioral rules which 
are sensitive to market share and potential size growth, depending on the preferences of 
the group for present or future market share. No other motives for group closure are mod-
eled. Market closure is not explicitly modeled as a collective action. Instead, only the 
effect of closing the market, namely the degree of market closure (Geschlossenheit), and 
not the process itself (Schließung) was implemented as a simplification of pure group 
competition through market closure. As discussed in Section 1 above, strategically clos-
ing a market to favor one’s group requires some form of concerted action aimed at modi-
fying the allocation rules of the market (e.g., the employer), which in turn presupposes a 
direct intervention of the state or other entity capable of regulating market transactions.  
Developing an explicit model for market closure that takes into account these complexi-
ties exceeds the analytical simplicity sought with the present model and therefore this was 
not implemented. 
  
Emergence: Intergroup inequality is the most interesting emergent property of the model 
and is a direct result of the combined effect of individual and group competition. Differ-
ences in market share are the clearest indicator of inequality. The higher the difference, 
the higher intergroup inequality will be (see Index of market share inequality in the Ap-
pendix).  
 
Adaptation: Unemployed workers adapt to market conditions by moving to a group with 
a higher employment rate. At the same time, groups adapt to market conditions by open-
ing or closing group boundaries in an attempt to protect or increase market share in the 
next period by keeping workers with lower skills at bay. To do so, they have to decide 
between tightening group boundaries, which protects group average skills and secures 
current market share, or making boundaries more permeable, which increases group size 
and may secure a larger portion of the market in the longer term at the cost of lowering 
average skill levels in the short run. Whether protection of accumulated resources or ex-
pansion is preferred depends on the group’s protection/expansion coefficient as well as on 
their current market share and potential size growth. By contrast, since the degree of mar-
ket closure is exogenous and fixed at t=1, it is insensitive to market conditions. All deci-
sions in the model are rule based and involve no costs.  
 
Objectives: Neither workers nor groups have an explicit objective function to maximize. 
However, both groups’ and workers’ rule-based adaptive behavior assumes an implicit 
objective. Groups strive to increase their market share, while workers aim at increasing 
the probability of getting a job. Adaptive behavior is heuristic and does not guarantee 
obtaining the expected results. 
 
Prediction: A form of prediction is implied by the behavioral rules that groups and work-
ers follow to adapt to market conditions. When a group closes its boundaries, it behaves 
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as if it knew that by doing so the level of skills, and with it its market share, will be safe-
guarded against new members with low skills in the future. Similarly, when a group 
opens its boundaries, it acts as if it could foresee the higher market share that could be 
achieved later if the group grew in size by admitting new members. By the same token, 
unemployed workers move to groups with a higher employment rate as if they could es-
timate the probability of getting a job in t+1. This predictive behavior is, again, ruled 
based and does not follow from the maximization of any explicit objective function. 
Sensing: The model assumes a market with perfect information. Sensing is global and 
information is observed without error. The employer observes the skills of all workers. 
Workers observe their own skills and employment rates of all groups. Groups observe 
their average skills, group size, market share, and total number of workers in the market.  
 
Interaction: Individual and group competition for jobs is the main form of interaction in 
the model. Competition is not direct but mediated. In the case of workers, they compete 
against each other for jobs and for group membership. Job competition is mediated by the 
employer, who has the power to change the employment status of workers. Group mem-
bership competition is in turn mediated by groups and their decision to accept or reject 
new group members based on their exclusivity factor. Similarly, group competition does 
not involve a direct interaction among groups. Rather, it is mediated by the degree of 
group and market closure. When closing boundaries, groups compete for workers and 
their skills by modifying their exclusivity factor, depending on market conditions, par-
ticularly market share and potential size growth. Group competition is further mediated 
by the size of the employer’s hiring bias coefficient.  If the coefficient is high, a group 
may secure an advantage in hiring for all their members on top of skill level, and thus 
gain a decisive edge over rival groups.  
 
Stochasticity: Random numbers are used to generate agents’ heterogeneity. Workers’ 
skills are random in order to avoid creating intergroup inequality from the outset and to 
allow for differences in market share among groups to emerge from the adaptive strate-
gies of agents. The protection/expansion coefficient of each group is also randomized. 
This makes the model less predictable and makes it possible to explore the dynamics of 
individual competition under different protection/expansion tendencies of groups.  
 
Collectives: Groups are both a collection of workers and a type of agent in the model.  
 
Observation: A dataset with average values of key variables for each model variation, 
design point, experimental run, and time period is produced (see experimental design 
below). In addition to the parameters of each design point, including number of groups, 
unemployment rate, and hiring bias coefficient, the dataset reports average protec-
tion/exclusion coefficients and exclusivity factors of the top percentile of groups ranked 
according to their employment rate. The maximum group size in each period and the 
main output variable, the index of inequality in market share, are also reported.  
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Details  
 
Initialization 
 
Time starts at 0. The model was initialized with 30 unemployed workers in each group. 
The exclusivity factor was initialized with the value of 1 to prevent workers from chang-
ing group in t=1 when all workers are still unemployed. The hiring probability for each 
group was set to 1 divided by the number of groups. The hiring bias coefficient at t=0 is 
0. Hence, without market closure, members of all groups have the same probability of 
being hired. A log-normal distribution with identical parameters for each equally sized 
group is used to generate workers’ initial skill level. There are two reasons why a log-
normal distribution is suitable for representing workers’ skills. First, all values of a log-
normal distribution are positive, something than cannot be guaranteed with a normal dis-
tribution. And second, the skewness and right tail of the resulting skill distribution re-
sembles observed income distributions in real labor markets.11 Skills are redrawn every 
simulation run. The speed of skill growth, which is controlled by a constant C or skill 
growth modifier (see submodels below), was set at a low arbitrary level of 1% to avoid 
explosive skill growth. Similarly, to prevent all unemployed workers rushing to the group 
with the highest employment rate, they choose randomly among the top 20% of the dis-
tribution of group employment rate. Initialization values are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Initialization 
 
Constants 
 Workers per group (supply) 30 
C (skill growth modifier) 0.01 
Reference percentile for group change 80 
  Agents’ State/Auxiliary Variables 
 Employment status 0 
Hiring probability 1/number of groups 
Hiring bias coefficient 0 
Exclusivity factor 1 
  
Pseudo-random parameters  
Workers’ skills 
(one distribution for each group) 
Log-normal distribution (un-
derlying normal distribution 
with µ= 1; σ= 0.2) 
Protection/expansion coefficients 
(one value for each group) 
Uniform continuous distribu-
tion; range: see factorial design 
 
Input data. No external data was used to initialize the simulation. 
                                                          
11 See Limpert et al. (2001) for a discussion of these and more properties of log-normal 
distributions. 
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Submodels  
 
For each of the processes listed above in the model description, the exact agent behavior 
is explained below.  
 
Change group (workers). After hiring takes place, some workers remain unemployed. 
Faced with unemployment, workers have to choose between remaining in their current 
group and profiting from the skills of their fellow workers, or changing to a new group 
and profiting from them instead. To avoid complicated calculations of the probability of 
getting a job as a member of any group at t+1 given observed group average skills and 
hiring probabilities at t, workers make their decision to change groups based on a simple 
heuristic followed simultaneously by all unemployed workers (synchronous updating). 
Unemployed workers move to one randomly chosen group from the top x percent of the 
group employment rate distribution. All things equal, the observed group employment 
rate at t is the best indicator of the probability of getting a job as a member of a given 
group at t+1. However, not all things are equal. Given that workers’ own skill level af-
fects group average skills, changing group in this way involves a sizable amount of uncer-
tainty. Even if all workers observe the same group employment rate distribution before 
changing groups, the number of workers actually moving to a new group and the resulting 
modified group skills are unknown to each worker. Moreover, they are also unaware of 
how many workers are in fact accepted in the new group and hence cannot accurately 
predict their skills level after workers have been reshuffled. Whether workers changing 
groups are rejected by the new group depends on the group’s exclusivity factor or proba-
bility of rejection. This is operationalized for every attempted change of group as a 
unique trial drawn from a binomial distribution with p=exclusivity factor. 
 
Compute group variables (groups). At each t, group size (S), potential size growth (SP), 
market share (M), average skills (KAvg), and employment rate (E) of a group g comprising 
n workers i are described by equations (1) to (5) 
 
 
  (1) 
 
         
   (2) 
 
 
      (3)  
 
 
  (4)  
 
 
(5) 
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Update skills (workers). Workers i in each group g update their skills (K) as a function of 
groups’ average skills according to equation (6) 
 
 
  (6) 
 
 
Without the inclusion of a simple mechanism to update workers’ skills, the results of the 
simulation would be trivial. Given that the employer hires workers with the highest skills 
and that skills are randomly distributed among individuals and groups, not allowing skills 
to be modified would mean workers on the upper area of the skill distribution would tend 
to remain employed until the end of the simulation. The same result would be achieved if 
skill growth is a linear function of actual skill growth: the higher the skill level, the faster 
the skill growth. The solution is to allow skills to grow as a function of group average 
skills but correct for actual skill level. As given by equation (6), the skills of workers 
below group average grow faster than those above group average. Multiplying group 
average skills by 2 prevents growth from becoming negative for workers with above-
average skills. The constant C or skill growth modifier controls how fast or slowly skills 
grow within the group.  
 
Hire workers (employer). Hiring is an iterative process. The employer observes the up-
dated distribution of skills after unemployed workers have moved to a new group and 
puts them in descending order. He then hires workers one at a time by setting their em-
ployment status to employed starting from the worker with the highest skill level down 
the distribution of skills until the fixed number of jobs demanded is reached. It is assumed 
that at each t, all workers are actively looking for a job, regardless of market conditions 
and employment history. This implies that before hiring, the employment status of all 
workers is set to unemployed. Although in principle all members of a given group enjoy 
the same probability PH =1/(number of groups) of being hired, those at the end of the 
queue are less likely to get the job since the probability that vacancies remain unfilled 
falls with each hiring iteration.  The decision of hiring is operationalized as a unique trial 
drawn from a binomial distribution with p = group’s hiring probability (PH). Hiring deci-
sions are, without hiring bias, ‘group blind.’ However, if the degree of market closure is 
greater than 0, the hiring probability PH of the one group favored by market closure is 
modified upwards by a hiring bias coefficient (CH), while that of the excluded groups is 
modified downwards as described by equation (7).  
    
 
(7)  
 
 
The hiring bias coefficient (CH), takes values between 0 (open market with equal hiring 
probabilities for each group) and 1 (closed market with hiring probability of 1 for one 
group and 0 for all others). Note that since 1/N is the initial hiring probability, what equa-
tion (7) does is to modify the hiring probability of each group, either bringing it closer to 
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1 (first if condition) or closer to 0 (second if condition). The magnitude of the modifica-
tion in both cases is a percentage of the distance between actual hiring probability and 1 
or 0, respectively. As shown in Table 5, with two groups (1 and 2), this means that the 
gain in absolute terms in the hiring probability of the group benefiting from market clo-
sure (P1H) is identical to the loss of group 2 (P2H). Hence ΔP1H = ΔP2H. With N>2, the 
equal losses of each group not benefiting from closure is added to the hiring probability 
of the privileged group. 
 
Table 5. Modified PgH with N=2 for different levels of CH.   
 
CH P1H P2H ΔP1H = ΔP2H 
0 .00 0 .50 0 .50 0 .00 
0 .20 0 .60 0 .40 0 .10 
0 .40 0 .70 0 .30 0 .20 
0 .60 0 .80 0 .20 0 .30 
0 .80 0 .90 0 .10 0 .40 
1 .00 1 .00 0 .00 0 .50 
 
 
Close/open group (groups). Unlike market closure, group closure is endogenous. At each 
t, groups compute an exclusivity factor (EF) based on observed market share (Mgt), poten-
tial size growth (SgP,t), and protection/expansion coefficient (CgP/E, t) as described by equa-
tion (8). 
 
 
(8)  
 
 
PE controls the relative importance of present market share and future market share in 
deciding how closed or open group boundaries should be. There is no utility function to 
maximize, nor a discount rate for values of future market share. A simple behavioral rule 
is assumed on the basis of observed state variables. The higher the value of PE and the 
higher the market share, the more likely it is that a group protects current employed 
workers by closing its boundaries to incoming unemployed workers. The more exclusive 
a group becomes, the higher the probability of rejecting new members up to a maximum 
value EF = 1 (CgP/E, t =0, Mgt = 1).  By contrast, the lower the value of PE and the higher 
the potential size growth, the more a group values growing in size as a means to a higher 
market share in the future. This leads to more permeable boundaries or no boundaries at 
all if the minimum is reached, where 0% of all new members are accepted (CgP/E, t = 0, 
SgP,t = 1). PE varies among groups. It is defined at the beginning of every simulation and 
remains constant for a particular simulation run.  
The simple mechanism to set the exclusivity factor described by (8) captures the logic 
of rationally driven group closure, as discussed in Section 1.4 above. Driven by shared 
economic interests, groups close their boundaries to protect accumulated resources and 
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open their boundaries to expand group size in the hope of increasing market share.  
Moreover, given that the exclusivity factor takes the form of a probability, it is not neces-
sary to be explicit about which attributes of workers are relevant for gaining access to the 
group. In the case of professional associations, it could, for example, be assumed that 
membership rules focus on those same skills that members need to be successful in the 
market. However, this need not always be the case. Group membership may be decided 
on the basis of ascriptive traits such as gender, ethnicity, or religion which bear little 
weight on the skills valued in the market. Explicitly modeling membership rules using 
different individual attributes correlated to different degrees to skills might be an interest-
ing extension of this submodel.  
 
Index of market share inequality (intergroup inequality). The index measures the ratio of 
the average distance of individual group market shares to mean market share and the 
maximum possible size of that distance. For a total of N groups, the numerator of the 
index is defined as the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the distribution of group mar-
ket shares M at t, as given by equation (9). With market share defined in the interval 
[0.1], mean market share MtAvg = 1/N. 
  
 
(9) 
 
 
Since market share is a number between 0 and 1, the maximum mean absolute deviation 
of the distribution MADmax for the market share (M) of any given number of groups N is 
reached when one group dominates the market with a market share of 1 while all other 
groups have a market share of zero. Thus, MADmax  can be simplified to equation (10).  
 
 
(10)   
 
 
Dividing (9) by (10), the index of intergroup market share inequality (I) is obtained in 
equation (11). 
 
 
(11)   
 
 
If the market share of all groups is equal, the index drops to the minimum value of 0. By 
contrast, if one group dominates the market, the index peaks at a maximum value of 1. 
For example, Table 6 shows the results of equations (9), (10), and (11) with N=2 groups 
in the market and using arbitrarily chosen market shares. A maximum level of intergroup 
inequality is reached at t=1 and t=7, while the minimum level is obtained at t=4. 
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Table 6. Example of values of index of market share inequality (I) 
 
t M1,t M2,t MtAvg MADt MADtMax It 
1 0 .00 1 .00 0 .50 0 .50 0 .50 1 .00 
2 0 .20 0 .80 0 .50 0 .30 0 .50 0 .60 
3 0 .40 0 .60 0 .50 0 .10 0 .50 0 .20 
4 0 .50 0 .50 0 .50 0 .00 0 .50 0 .00 
5 0 .60 0 .40 0 .50 0 .10 0 .50 0 .20 
6 0 .80 0 .20 0 .50 0 .30 0 .50 0 .60 
7 1 .00 0 .00 0 .50 0 .50 0 .50 1 .00 
 
2.4. Experimental Design: Exploring Different Combinations of Market and 
Group Closure under Varying Levels of Individual Competition 
The model was implemented using Python. DOE (Lorscheid et al. 2011) was used to set 
up the experiment and initialize the remaining model parameters, including number of 
time periods, number of groups, unemployment rate (intensity of individual competition), 
and hiring bias coefficient. As already explained above, the hiring bias coefficient im-
plements the degree of market closure as an exogenous parameter. By contrast, the degree 
of group closure captured by the exclusivity factor is determined endogenously (see sub-
models). Table 7 summarizes dependent, independent, and control variables.  
 
 
Table 7. Classification of variables 
 
Dependent variable Independent variables Control variables 
Average differences in market 
share over all t (index of mar-
ket share inequality) 
Hiring bias coefficient  Time periods 
Number of groups 
Unemployment rate 
  
 
A factorial experimental design with three factor levels for control variables and eleven 
factor levels for the independent variable, a total of 108 design points, was implemented 
(Table 8). To establish the optimal number of runs (n) for each set of factors, the experi-
mental error was computed for the dependent variable in a subsample of 48 design points  
for n = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100, 250, and 500.  For each n and each design point, the 
coefficient of variation Cv = std. dev./mean was estimated (Lorscheid et al. 2011). Re-
sults indicate that Cv stabilizes around 30 iterations at most, although for over half of the 
subsample of 48 design points, results are stable even with as few as 5 runs.  As a result, 
30 iterations were run for each design point.  
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Table 8. Factorial design 
 
Factors Factor level range Factor levels 
Hiring bias coefficient [∈ 0, 1] {0, 0.2, 0.4,0.6, 0.8, 1} 
Time periods [∈ 0, ∞] {100, 300} 
Number of groups [∈ 2, ∞] {5, 10, 25} 
Unemployment rate  [∈ 0, 1] {0.1, 0.2, 0.4} 
 
Using this factorial design, three models were explored. First, a null model was run for 
the 18 combinations of control variables in which all workers’ and groups’ actions are 
turned off. Workers do not change groups, nor are their skills updated. Groups refrain 
from closing the group. Second, an open-groups model was run for all 108 design points 
with group closure turned off. Third, a full model including all processes described in the 
previous section was used.  The diverse constellations produced by these three models 
allow us to explore intergroup inequality under varying degrees of market and group clo-
sure, time horizons, number of competing groups, and labor market conditions.  Most 
importantly, it makes it possible to investigate the four causal paths connecting individual 
and group competition to intergroup inequality separately (see Section 2.3). Table 9 
summarizes the three model variations. 
 
Table 9. Model variations  
 
Model Restrictions Design points 
Null model 
Workers: no skill upgrade, no group change 
Groups: no group closure 
Hiring bias coefficient (degree of market closure) = 0 
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Open-groups 
model 
Groups: no group closure 108 
Full model None 108 
 
2.5. Results 
To better understand the different processes modeled, each of the four causal paths identi-
fied in Section 2.1 was isolated and analyzed separately. Since the simulations were run 
30 times and over various time periods for each parameter setting, results are presented as 
box plots of the distribution of model outcomes over all time periods, except for the ini-
tial period t=0, and all model runs.  
 
(i) Pure individual competition (null model). Turning off group closure and workers’ skill 
updates, and setting the degree of market closure to zero, the model becomes predictable. 
Without group hiring bias and skill growth, market inequality is fully explained by the 
differences in skill levels among groups. Although those with the highest skills are more 
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likely to be employed, since skills are drawn randomly from a log-normal distribution 
with identical parameters for each group, differences in market share among groups re-
main low. Intergroup inequality could be arbitrarily raised by simply initializing the mod-
el with an unequal distribution of skills among groups.  
As shown in Figure 1, the only factor that affects the overall level of intergroup ine-
quality is the unemployment rate. Given that hiring starts with the workers with highest 
skills and goes on iteratively down the distribution of skills until all vacancies are filled, 
the higher the unemployment rate, or, in other words, the fewer the vacancies, the more 
crucial it is to be at the front of the skills queue. In other words, given the way the hiring 
process was implemented, a tight labor market elevates the premium of having higher 
skills. Higher rates of unemployment magnify any small differences in the skill distribu-
tion among groups and produce comparatively greater intergroup inequality. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Pure individual competition, intergroup inequality and unemployment 
 
 
(ii) Individual competition through group membership (open-groups model with degree of 
market closure= 0). Allowing for skills to grow as a function of group average skills and 
for unemployed workers to move freely to groups with higher employment rates dramati-
cally increases the levels of intergroup inequality. As shown in Figure 2, a smaller num-
ber of groups and larger unemployment rates are associated with higher intergroup ine-
quality. As unemployment rates grow, the pressure on unemployed workers to leave the 
group increases. Groups with higher employment rates tend to attract more unemployed 
workers over time and quickly consolidate into a few big groups. Some groups even lose 
all their members during this process of polarization of market share. The fewer groups in 
the market, the more likely it is that a single dominant group emerges and hoards most of 
workers. Thus, in addition to inequality produced by pure individual competition, as indi-
vidual competition through group membership increases, driven by high unemployment 
and small numbers of alternative groups to move to, intergroup inequality explodes.   
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Figure 2. Intergroup inequality, number of groups and unemployment 
(iii) Group competition through group closure (full model with degree of market closure=0). 
Adding group closure to the mix, groups have the choice of regulating how many unem-
ployed workers they let in. The more they value present market share, the more likely they 
are to reject new workers. The opposite is true when groups place more emphasis on size 
growth and future market share than in protection of current market share. However, all else 
held constant, more groups necessarily implies smaller initial market shares for each group 
and hence bigger potential size growth. Therefore, even when protection/expansion coeffi-
cients indicate a high preference for present market share, and irrespective of level of unem-
ployment, if the number of groups is large, groups are more readily inclined to open their 
boundaries and bet on expansion. This tendency is depicted on Figure 3 using mean values of 
the exclusivity factor for the top quintile of groups with the highest employment rate over all 
experiments.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean exclusivity factor and group size 
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As it was shown with models (i) and (ii), with open groups, higher unemployment leads 
to a process of market share polarization and high intergroup inequality, particularly pro-
nounced when the number of groups is small. However, allowing for group closure, the 
same process that drives group consolidation forward also pushes groups to tighten their 
boundaries. Instead of exacerbating intergroup inequality when unemployment is high, 
group closure in fact reduces inequality by putting a cap on the process of group consoli-
dation and limiting the emergence of extreme differences in market share. Closed groups 
do not grow. As shown in Table 10, the relationship between group closure and inter-
group inequality tends to be more negative with fewer groups and higher unemployment 
rates. The higher the floating population of unemployed workers, the more effective is 
group closure in preventing one group from dominating the market, although inequality 
tends to be greater with higher unemployment. At extreme levels of unemployment and 
with many groups in the market, the negative relationship between group closure and 
inequality seems to flatten somewhat. Under such extreme conditions, the sheer number 
of workers rushing to the groups with the highest employment rate takes away some of 
the effectiveness of group closure to slow down market share polarization. 
 
Table 10.  Correlation between market share inequality and mean exclusivity factor  
 
 Unemployment 
low (5%) high (20%) extreme (50%) 
N groups = 5 -0.03 -0.60 -0.57 
N groups = 10 -0.24 -0.69 -0.56 
N groups = 20 -0.33 -0.57 -0.36 
 
(iv) Pure group competition through market closure (open-groups model with variable 
degree of market closure). Contrary to the inhibitory effect of group closure on the pro-
cess of consolidation of group size and polarization of market share observed in a model 
with unfettered individual competition in a market with open group boundaries (ii), mar-
ket closure acts as a catalyst. By allowing workers to move freely into the group benefit-
ing from market closure, the emergence of a dominant group that hoards all workers and 
jobs is unavoidable and swift. The higher the degree of market closure, the faster a domi-
nant group appears.  Increasing the number of groups slightly slows down the process 
(see Figure 4), while higher unemployment further accelerates it (see Figure 5).12 In the 
end, however, is only a matter of time until intergroup inequality inescapably reaches its 
maximum value of 1. 
 
                                                          
12 Given that in some cases the steady state of the model is not reached after 100 periods of 
time, the graphs only show the design points where time was allowed to reach 300. 
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Figure 4. Number of groups and number of periods to reach maximum inequality 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Unemployment and number of periods to reach maximum inequality 
 
After this discussion of how each of the four processes of individual and group competi-
tion bring about intergroup inequality separately, Table 11 summarizes the minimum, 
mean, and maximum levels of market share inequality produced by each process. As was 
argued above, results show that each process is independently sufficient to produce mod-
erate and high levels of intergroup inequality. The fact that pure individual competition 
generates only relatively low levels of market share inequality should not affect the valid-
ity of this conclusion, since it follows from the conscious decision to initialize the model 
with worker skills equally distributed among groups. Initializing the model with an une-
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qual distribution of skills would mean market share inequality reaching high values com-
parable to those in processes ii, iii, and iv. 
 
Table 11.  Different levels of inequality obtained from each model variation 
 
Index of market share inequality Min Mean Max 
(i) Pure individual competition 0.02 0.04 0.09 
(ii) Individual competition through group membership 0.12 0.42 0.99 
(iii) Group competition through group closure 0.10 0.32 0.78 
(iv) Pure group competition through market closure 0.61 0.95 1.00 
 
 
(v) All processes at the same time (full model).  While each process can produce high 
levels of inequality separately, what happens if they all interact simultaneously? Letting 
all independent and control variables vary in the full model makes it difficult to under-
stand the output using simple two-dimensional graphs as has been done so far. Instead, 
regression analysis was used on the output dataset to produce a three-dimensional re-
sponse surface that represents the relationship between degree of market closure, degree 
of group closure, and intergroup inequality under different combinations of number of 
groups and unemployment rate for each experiment across all design points. Since the 
dependent variable, the index of market share inequality, is defined in the range [0.1], a 
Tobit regression was used with right-censored values set at 1. Independent and control 
variables were included linearly in the model, as well as interaction terms among them 
and quadratic terms for degree of market and group closure. 
Results are shown in Figure 6. Darker regions of the surface (red) correspond to high-
er inequality, lighter regions (blue) to lower inequality. Three results are worth mention-
ing. First, as already shown in the previous model variations, it is still true that higher 
unemployment and fewer groups exert pressure on workers to amalgamate into a few 
dominant groups and produce high levels of intergroup inequality. Thus, on average, 
market share inequality is highest in the top right-hand graph (5 groups and extreme un-
employment) and lowest in the bottom left-hand graph (20 groups and low unemploy-
ment).  
Second, the interaction between group and market closure is not linear and depends on 
both number of groups and unemployment rate. Although low degrees of group closure 
combine with high levels of market closure to increase intergroup inequality, as group 
closure increases, it waters down the impact of market closure on inequality. Therefore, 
from the perspective of group closure, market closure enhances its power to slow down 
market share polarization; from the perspective of market closure, group closure reduces 
its effectiveness to accelerate that same process.  The negative interaction between the 
two forms of closure becomes stronger the more intensive individual competition for 
group membership is, as captured by number of groups and unemployment rates. Why the 
interaction is negative is easy to reconstruct. If employers are only allowed to hire work-
ers from one group (high degree of market closure) but only a small portion of unem-
ployed workers are permitted into the group (high degree of group closure), a labor short-
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age is created that reduces the overall number of employed workers and limits market 
share differences among groups. The interesting question raised by this combination of 
high levels of market and group closure is what happens when demand remains unsatis-
fied, something that was not modeled in the simulations. Will groups change their prefer-
ence for future market share and open the group despite market dominance to meet excess 
demand? Or will the employer simply decide to ignore market closure and hire workers 
from other groups to fill all vacancies? If labor shortage leads to opening the group, inter-
group inequality would rise further, whereas if it leads to opening the market, inequality 
would fall.  
Third, and in line with the results summarized in Table 11, different combinations of 
individual and group competition produce varying levels of intergroup inequality, from 
low through intermediate to high.  A high degree of market closure leads to high levels of 
inequality if combined with a low degree of group closure, but it produces intermediate 
market share inequality if group closure is high. By contrast, while a low degree of group 
closure produces low intergroup inequality if combined with no market closure, as the 
degree of market closure grows, so does inequality. In addition, and irrespective of levels 
of group or market closure, a reduced number of groups and a higher unemployment rate 
push market share inequality upwards.  
In conclusion, not only are pure individual competition, individual competition 
though group membership, group competition through  group closure, and pure group 
competition through market closure independently sufficient to produce comparable lev-
els of inequality, but also their interaction is equally capable of bringing about a compa-
rably broad spectrum of possible levels of intergroup inequality. This is the reason why, 
in the face of a given unequal distribution of resources, for instance, a market for ac-
countancy services where 80% of all transactions are in the hands of one particular pro-
fessional association, these four different mechanisms have to be analyzed and their dis-
tinct causal paths disentangled both analytically and empirically. Are practitioners ac-
counting for 80% of the market better competitors if taken individually? Is their individu-
al advantage the result of group membership? What attributes are decisive for becoming 
part of a group that grants advantages to its members? Or is their advantageous position 
the inevitable consequence of a market in which allocation rules are biased towards one 
group? Failure to answer these questions will render any explanation of group-related 
inequality incomplete. 
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Figure 6. Response surface for market share inequality and degree of market and group closure 
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3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Revisiting Weber, two forms of closure were identified. The first, market closure, denotes 
collective action aimed at excluding rival groups from competition. The second, group 
closure, refers to groups drawing boundaries against outsiders. The acts of closing the 
market and closing the group (Schließung), which necessarily imply the existence of col-
lective actors and agency, were in turn distinguished from their outcomes; the mere exist-
ence of a closed market, or a market where allocation is conditioned by group member-
ship, and a closed group, or the mere existence of membership rules. To refer to the latter, 
the concept of degree of closure was introduced (Geschlossenheit). The importance of 
distinguishing between these two forms of closure and drawing a line between closure as 
an action and its outcome was further illustrated using a simple computational agent-
based model (ABM) implemented using Python. The results of the simulation show that 
individual competition, market and group closure, both individually and in combination 
under different market conditions, are causally sufficient to produce varying levels of 
intergroup inequality.  
The discussion on the meaning of closure and the simulation model can be seen as a 
plea for urgently needed conceptual and methodological rigor when raising causal claims 
about the origin of intergroup inequality. Any empirical study making a case for closure 
as an explanation of inequality should provide unambiguous evidence of the existence of 
a collective actor, the ability of this to take concerted action and the effectiveness of ef-
forts to exclude individuals from the group and rivals from the market. Gender, age, or 
occupation certainly might provide a basis for boundary making, collective action, and 
closure practices. It is, however, a mistake to animate these categories and regard them as 
collective actors acting strategically and effectively simply because we observe an une-
qual distribution of resources among individuals grouped by them. Although it could be 
shown that some categorically defined collectives do constitute a group with shared eco-
nomic interests (e.g., lawyers), this need not imply that the group is capable of concerted 
collective action (Olson 1971). Moreover, the fact that a well-constituted group decides to 
act upon its interests does not guarantee that its action will bring about the desired results, 
as was shown in the case of British accountants discussed by Walker & Shackleton 
(1998).  
Finally, even if it were the case that collective actors do in fact exist and successfully 
practice closure, it is not a priori clear, as illustrated by the simulation, what combination 
of pure individual competition, individual competition through group membership, group 
competition through group closure, and pure group competition through market closure 
causes intergroup inequality. These processes must be disentangled and isolated both 
analytically and empirically if they are to be used constructively as an explanation for 
inequality. Otherwise, claims about the importance of closure in the production of ine-
quality would at best be incomplete, if not entirely misleading. Ignoring this warning will 
inevitably lead to sloppy storytelling, which, if not prevented, threatens to drain the ex-
planatory substance from the notion of closure.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 12. Selected studies applying the concept of closure empirically 
 
Subject Article(s) 
  
Professions and occupations 
Macdonald (1985); Amark (1990); Chua & Clegg (1990); 
Chua & Poullaos (1998); Richardson (1997); Walker & 
Shackleton (1998); Ramirez (2001); Weeden (2002); 
Kidder (2004); Welsh et al. (2004); Hollenberg (2006); 
Kelner et al. (2006); O’Regan (2008); Giesecke & Ver-
wiebe (2009); Groß (2009); Lee (2010); Weiss & Miller 
(2010); Haupt (2012). 
 
Gender and racial discrimination Roscigno et al. (2007); Roscigno (2007); Roscigno et al. 
(2009); Stainback (2009); Tomaskovic-Devey (1993a 
1993b); Elliott & Smith (2001); Neuwirth (1969). 
 
Ageism Roscigno et al. (2007). 
 
Workplace incivilities Roscigno et al. (2009). 
 
Educational homogamy Smits (2003); Smits & Park (2009). 
 
Citizenship Brubaker (1992). 
 
Welfare state Rodger (1992). 
 
Social movements McCauley (1990). 
 
Religion Vertigans (2007). 
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